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SOLICITATION AS DOING BUSINESS-
A REVIEW OF NEW YORK AND FEDERAL CASES
FREDERICK B. LACEYt
PERSONAL service of process upon a foreign corporation within the
forum state presents two problems. The plaintiff must first assure
himself that his adversary is subject to personal service. Ordinarily this
amenability to service is a result of doing business within the state of
the forum. Next he is obliged to consider if there is, within the juris-
diction, a representative of the corporation who may properly be served
with the summons. It is only with the first question that this article
will concern itself.1
DOING BUSINESS
It is commonly misconceived that the test of "doing business" is only
a quantitative one; for example, that the particular practice relied upon
by the plaintiff to establish the court's jurisdiction must be continuous,
systematic and regular; that the corporation must be engaged in the
forum state "with a fair measure of permanence and continuity"; 2 and
that the activity engaged in must be a "substantial part" of the main
business of the defendant.' However, the "doing business" enigma has
another facet, for the courts have had much difficulty in deciding what
the qualitative test should be-that is, what kinds of activities of a
foreign corporation should be held to be of a business nature for the
"doing business" requirement.4
t Member of the New York Bar.
1. Three theories have been advanced to sustain personal jurisdiction over corporations
foreign to the forum state: (1) The consent theory; (2) The presence theory; (3) The
submission theory. Prashker, Service of Summons on Non-Resident Natural Persons
Doing Business in New York, 15 ST. Joint's L. RaV. 1 (1940).
See generally, 18 FLETCHER, Cyc. CoRP. § 8718 (Perm. ed. 1933); 2 MOORE'S FDERAL
PRACTiCE 969 et seq. (2d ed. 1948); Cahill, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 30
HARv. L. REV. 676 (1917); Culp, Constitutional Problems Arising from Service of Process
on Foreign Corporations, 19 MiNN. L. REv. 375 (1935); Fead, Jurisdiction Over Foreign
Corporations, 24 MIcn. L. REv. 633 (1926); Haffer, Foreign Corporations as Defendants,
17 B. U. L. REV. 639 (1937) ; Isaacs, An Analysis of Doing Business, 25 CoL. L. REv. 1018
(1925) ; Scott, Jurisdiction Over Nonresidents Doing Business in a State, 32 HARv. L. REv.
871 (1919); Eulette, Service on Foreign Corporations, 20 Cm-KrrT REv. 287 (1942);
Farrier, Jurisdiction Over Foreign Corporations, 17 Min,. L. REv. 270 (1933); Louisville
& N. Ry. v. Chatters, 279 U. S. 320 (1929); McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U. S. 90 (1917);
Lafayette Ins. Co. v. French, 18 How. 404 (U. S. 1855).
2. Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 267, 115 N. E. 915, 917 (1917).
See also Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264, 265 (1917); Chaplin v.
Selznick, 293 N. Y. 529, 58 N. E. 2d 719 (1944).
3. Holzer v. Dodge Bros., 233 N. Y. 216, 221, 135 N. E. 268, 269 (1922).
4. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U. S. 530, 532 (1907): ". . . it is obvious that
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SoLIcrTATIoN OF BusnEss
By solicitation is here meant that practice of business which is the
foundation of sales, a practice perhaps best exemplified by the so-called
"drummers" who cover the countryside and procure orders for their
employers. Customarily these orders are made subject to acceptance
at the home office and are fulfilled by dispatching the product directly
to the customer from the home office outside the state.
Solicitation is essential to the success of any large business enterprise
dependent upon selling to the public, and is often the vital part of the
whole sales transaction. Surely no business man would argue that
solicitation is not "doing business."" Yet, because of an old Supreme
Court decision,6 courts for years have held that "mere solicitation" is
not that type of activity which satisfies the qualitative requirement of
"doing business."'
The judicial history of solicitation of business as it relates to our
jurisdictional problem commenced with Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry.8
in 1907. The Railway defendant had its business organization and
trackage not in the forum state of Pennsylvania but in another juris-
diction. Suit was brought in a Pennsylvania Federal District Court and
the defendant denied its corporate presence within the forum. It ad-
mitted that the agent who had been served with process was employed
to solicit freight and passenger traffic to be transported over its roads,
and that for this purpose he was given an office and was furnished
clerks and traveling passenger and freight agents who reported to him.
He also performed other minor services, but he sold no tickets and
received no payment for the transportation of freight. Mr. Justice Moody
stated the holding of the U. S. Supreme Court:
"The business shown in this case was, in substance, nothing more than that
of solicitation. Without undertaking to formulate any general rule defining
what transactions will constitute 'doing business' in the sense that liability to
service is incurred, we think that this is not enough to bring the defendant
within the district so that process can be served upon it."0
the defendant was doing there a considerable business of a certain kind, although there
was no carriage of freight or passengers."
5. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 516 (D. C. Cir. 1943).
6. Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry., 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
7. Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 520 (D. C. Cir. 1943), where Judge
Stephens, dissenting, stated: "It is well settled that the solicitation of orders in one juris-
diction which are forwarded to the home office of a corporation in another jurisdiction
for acceptance or rejection and the shipping of the ordered goods into the juisdiction in
which the solicitation took place, do not constitute the doing or transacting of business
therein by the foreign corporation.' (Citing Green v. Chicago, B. & Q. Ry. and others).
8. 205 U. S. 530 (1907).
9. Id. at 533.
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Since that time it has become almost axiomatic that mere solicitation
does not constitute "doing business." Examination of the Green case
reveals, however, that more than solicitation was carried on by the
railroad in Pennsylvania, and it is not unlikely that the Supreme Court
was influenced in large measure by the fact that suit had been brought
on a cause of action which had arisen outside the forum. Moreover, the
injury asserted was not a result of the activities carried on within the
forum state. Accurate a this analysis may be, however, it is still true
that the Green decision stood for years, and as will be shown, may
still stand, as the primary precedent for all "solicitation" cases. But
that Mr. Justice Moody and his associates may have been actuated
by principles of fairness should not be overlooked in the light of recent
developments in this field."0
The highest Court handled the question again in 1914, in International
Harvester Co. v. Kentucky." This case is treated generally as making
Green of dubious reliability, but it is difficult to apprehend why this
should be so. Admittedly the Court here characterized the earlier deci-
sion as an "extreme case," but by the same token it expressly dis-
avowed any intention of overruling what was even at this time showing
signs of being a problem child of adjective law.' Instead, the Court
distinguished the earlier case and found that in addition to solicitation
of orders there was, as a result of these orders, a continuous stream
of shipments of machines into Kentucky, the forum state. It was also
pointed out that the agents in Kentucky were authorized to receive pay-
ment in money, or draft, and could take notes payable at Kentucky
banks. 3 Two years later, in another "doing business" case, the Supreme
10. Farmers' Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286 Fed. 566, 568, 579 (E. D.
Ky. 1922) sets out a detailed analysis of the Green case along the lines here suggested.
For a modem exposition of the "fair play" formula see International Shoe Co. v. Wash-
ington, 326 U. S. 310, 319 (1945); Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930); Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., 134 F. 2d 511, 518 (D. C. Cir. 1943)
(concurring opinion of Judge Edgerton). See also Smolik v. Philadelphia & Reading Coal
& Iron Co., 222 Fed. 148 (S. D. N. Y. 1915); cf. Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F.
2d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1928): "Nor is the fact . . . that the cause of action asserted here
arose in New York material, unless the corporation was doing business in the sense that
is required to subject it to jurisdiction. . . ." Bomze v. Nardis Sportswear Inc., 165 F. 2d
33, 35 (2d Cir. 1948), reversing 68 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. N. Y. 1946): "We understand
that since Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. . . . the law of New York has been that a
foreign corporation is either 'present' or it is not; and once it is found to be 'present,'
it becomes subject to process, regardless of whether the particular liability in suit has
arisen out of the activities which collectively constitute the 'presence.'"
11. 234 U. S. 579 (1914).
12. Id. at 586.
13. judge Learned Hand stated in Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, 45 F. 2d 139, 141
(2d Cir. 1930): "Possibly the maintenance of a regular agency for the solicitation of
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Court did not feel constrained to mention this decision which bad made
Green "somewhat doubtful," and, quite to the contrary, cited the latter
holding to support a finding that a foreign corporation defendant was
not "doing business" within the state of New York.14 Admittedly the
reference made by Mr. Justice Brandeis was dictum, but the Court
nevertheless made clear that it regarded Green as being of full and
undiminished vigor, International Harvester notwithstanding?'
The next year, 1918, in People's Tobacco Co. v. American Tobacco
Co.,'6 the high tribunal reaffirmed its faith in the Green decision when
it vacated service of process upon a soliciting foreign corporation, again
because "mere solicitation" was not "doing business" for purposes of
corporate "presence." International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky was
shrugged off as involving in addition to a continuous course of solicita-
tion the factor of authority on the part of agents to receive payments
on behalf of their employer."
business will serve without more. The answer made in Green v. Chicago, Burlington &
Quincy Ry. Co., 205 U. S. 530 (1907) ... perhaps becomes somewhat doubtful in the light
of International Harvester Co. v. Kentucky, 234 U. S. 579 . . . and, if it still remains
true, it readily yields to slight additions." Judge Cardozo, in Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal
Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917), distinguished Green from International Harvester
because in the latter there had been a steady stream of shipments into the state as a
result of continuous solicitation.
14. Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917). Leakley v.
Canadian Pac. Express Co., 82 F. Supp. 906 (D. C. Alaska 1949).
15. That this was dictum seems clear. The points of contact within the assertive state
were certain displays of the defendant company's name in a local terminal maintained
by another railroad, a New York City telephone listing paid for by that other railroad,
and finally, the presence of certain subsidiary companies within New York State. Some
evidence was also introduced to show that the defendant company connected outside New
York with carriers operating within New York and that the local carrier sold tickets for
the through trip. In his opinion Mr. Justice Brandeis gave no intimation that he saw
here any issue of solicitation.
16. 246 U. S. 79 (1918). Here the so-called solicitors did not directly obtain contracts.
Instead they promoted purchases by retailers from jobbers, and the latter would then
buy from the employer of the agent. W. S. Tyler Co. v. Ludlow-Saylor Wire Co., 236
U. S. 723 (1915).
17. In addition to the cases discussed in the text, the following typify the spirit of
adherence to Green: Bank of America v. Whitney Cent. Nat. Bank, 261 U. S. 171 (1923);
Toledo Railways & Light Co. v. Hill, 244 U. S. 49 (1917); Cannon v. Time, Inc., 115 F.
2d 423 (4th Cir. 1940); Whitaker v. MacFadden Publications, 105 F. 2d 44 (D. C. Cir.
1939); Peebles v. Chrysler Corp., 57 F. 2d 867 (W. D. Mo. 1932); Cancelmo v. Seaboard
Air Line Ry., 12 F. 2d 166 (D. C. Cir. 1926); Richardson v. North American Clay Co.,
41 F. Supp. 528 (S. D. N. Y. 1941); Kriger v. MacFadden Publications, 38 F. Supp. 472
(D. C. Md. 1941); las v. Owens-Illinois Glass Co., 34 F. Supp. 415 (E. D. Va. 1940).
A newspaper maintaining a Washington, D. C. office for collecting and reporting news,
was held not to be doing business within the District, Neely v. Philadelphia Inquirer Co.,
62 F. 2d 873 (D. C. Cir. 1932). This was held to be so even where its chief correspondent
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SOLICITATION IN THE LOWER FEDERAL COURTS
After the Tobacco Company decision of 1918 even the most unyield-
ing had to acknowledge that International Harvester was to be viewed
in a new light, and the courts commenced to use it as the bulwark for
the thesis that solicitation and something more constituted "doing busi-
ness." The lower federal courts, and the state courts as well, were to
spend many years and decide many cases in what appears to have been
an unsuccessful attempt to arrive at a definitive rule of law regarding
what practices, when added to solicitation, sufficed to satisfy the quali-
tative test of "doing business."
In Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co. a foreign corporation employed
a soliciting agent within New York State and he sent his orders to
the home office for acceptance.' Shipments were then made to cus-
tomers f.o.b. the home office. The agent rendered no invoices and kept
no accounting records, but upon occasion he would try to assist in the
collection of overdue accounts and was empowered to make adjustments
subject to company approval. Infrequently he would sell goods which had
previously come into New York as samples. The court stated unequivo-
cally that mere renting of an office and solicitation of business in a
foreign state were insufficient to make for corporate "presence" there.
Furthermore, those additional activities, generally required beyond mere
solicitation, were not engaged in by the defendant in the case at bar.
Hence service was vacated. The court was of the mind that settlement
of claims by the soliciting agent was too sporadic and that the sales
of samples formed too small a part of the total business of the corpo-
ration to be considered as a material addition to the solicitation. Here
then was what the "solicitation plus" formula had conceived. We were
back at the quantitative test, and the additional activities had to be
regular and not sporadic; and there was also the suggestion that they
had to constitute a substantial part of the total business of the foreign
corporation. 9
had authority to purchase supplies and employ telegraph operators, Layne v. Tribune
Company, 71 F. 2d 223 (D. C. Cir. 1934), cert. denied, 293 U. S. 572 (1934).
18. 29 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir. 1928). Judge Augustus Hand wrote the opinion in which
Judges Learned Hand and Swan joined. This was an action which started in the New York
County Supreme Court and was removed to the United States District Court. The latter
had then set aside service of process.
19. Id. at 167: "The acts had no substantial bearing upon the general conduct of its
business." The court distinguished the case at bar from Penn. Lumbermen's Mutual Fire
Ins. Co. v. Meyer, 197 U. S. 407 (1905). In the latter case it had been held that sending
agents into a foreign state to adjust fire insurance losses on policies covering property
within that state was doing business. Judge Hand had this to say: "But such adjustments
are unlike the settlement of occasional disputes with customers, who have purchased
merchandise, and are rather the inevitable and constant incidents of an insurance business.
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Two years later, and in the same Circuit Court of Appeals, the vexing
question came up again.20 The foreign corporation defendant leased an
office in New York City from which certain soliciting activities were
directed. A lone stenographer was employed in the office. It also ap-
peared that a small bank account was maintained in New York. The
directors and shareholders always met in Boston, except that once, on
two successive days the directors met in New York, and on one of these
days the shareholders also convened there. The name of the corpo-
ration of course appeared in the appropriate New York City telephone
directory and also upon the office door. On the other hand, all corporate
records were in Boston and all the directors resided there. The court
again decided that there was not sufficient additional business activity
over and above solicitation to justify a departure from the Green rule.
In his opinion, Judge Learned Hand laid down a standard for guidance
in "doing business" cases, a standard which was to find expression
several years later in a Supreme Court decision.2' It was the standard
of fairness. He felt that in the final analysis it was fairer that the
plaintiffs should be required to go to Massachusetts than to hold that
the defendant should be burdened with defending in New York: ".... all
the defendant's local activities, taken together, do not make it reasona-
ble to impose such a burden upon it."22
While the hammering out of rules of law to accord with the Green
rule was continuing apace, the rule itself was undergoing severe criti-
cism in Frene v. Louisville Cement Co., a case in which the late Mr.
Justice Rutledge, then a Circuit Court of Appeals judge, wrote the
majority opinion. In deciding that solicitation and something more
constituted "doing business," he stated:
"The tradition has grown that personal jurisdiction of a foreign corporation
cannot be acquired when the only basis is 'mere solicitation' of business within
...We regard sporadic settlements of claims such as are disclosed in the present record
as entirely different.. . ." 29 F. 2d 164, 166 (2d Cir. 1928); cf. St. Louis S. W. Ry. v.
Alexander, 227 U. S. 218 (1913).
20. Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert, Inc., 45 F. 2d 139 (2d Cir. 1930). judges L. Hand,
who wrote the opinion, A. Hand and Swan sat in this case. This cause also vms removed
from the state courL
21. International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U. S. 310 (1945).
22. 45 F. 2d 139, 142 (2d Cir. 1930).
23. 134 F. 2d 511 (D. C. Cir. 1943); cf. Missouri, K. & T. R. R. v. Reynolds, 255
U. S. 565 (1921). But cf. Mu eller Brass Co. v. Alexander Milburn Co., 152 F. 2d 142
(D. C. Cir. 1945). That continuous solicitation is doing business, the Green case nohAth-
standing: American Asphalt Roof Corp. v. Shankand, 205 Iowa 862, 219 N. W. 28 (1928);
International Shoe Co. v. Lovejoy, 219 Iowa 204, 257 N. W. 576 (1934); Tauza v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917). In this last case, of course,




the borders of the forum's sovereignty. And this is true, whether the solicitation
is only casual or occasional or is regular, continuous and long continued." 24
He then proceeded to show that jurisdiction had been extended to include
many types of occasional acts and he therefore reasoned that the rule
of Green was a legal anachronism. He also devoted a part of his
opinion to the stressing of the vital part solicitation plays in business
affairs, and he closed with a plea for an abandonment of the "mere
solicitation" rule, the integrity of which "has been much impaired by
the decisions which sustain jurisdiction when very little more than
'mere solicitation' is done."25
In Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ry. the Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit found the requisite additional activities over and above
solicitation and sustained service. 20  The acts deemed material were
the selling of tickets for transportation on the defendant's own lines
and the issuing of bills of lading, all of which was done in New York,
the forum state. The court denied that the defendant was within the
Green rule.
There is an implication in at least one federal case that employment
of independent brokers to solicit business may cause the courts to re-
quire additional activities to an even greater degree than ordinarily,
before they will find corporate "presence."2 8 In this case there was
24. Id. at 514.
25. Id. at 517 (referring to Farmers' Merchants' Bank v. Federal Reserve Bank, 286
Fed. 566 (E. D. Ky. 1922); see note 10 supra).
26. 145 F. 2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944). Judge Frank wrote the prevailing opinion in which
Judge Clark joined. Judge Swan dissented on the basis that the case was controlled by
Philadelphia & Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917). Judge Frank stated:
"Here there were more than 'slight additions', i.e., the actual selling of tickets for
transportation on defendant's line and the issuance of bills of lading in New York (to
say nothing of the handling of complaints). It is urged that not many of these acts
occurred each year. But those acts were authorized by defendant which put no limit
on the number of such acts that its employees might perform. We think that the author-
ized performance of such acts constitutes doing business in New York, even if the volume
of freight and passenger business initiated in New York is not as great as, we may surmise,
defendant would like it to be." 145 F. 2d 800, 804 (2d Cir. 1944).
27. The defendant had apparently stated that it had established its New York office
as well as its mode of conduct in reliance upon Green. Judge Frank was unsympathetic.
He said that International Harvester and Hutchinson v. Chase & Gilbert had given warning
that such precedents as Green were not likely to protect the defendant, since it carried
on other activities in addition to solicitation. Significantly, Judge Frank made mention
of Mr. Justice Rutledge's opinion in the Frene case, but stated that he was not citing it
as precedent because it dealt with a commercial business and not with a railroad.
28. Deutsch v. Hoge, 146 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 852 (1945).
The defendants herein were individuals from Ohio who were in "business" in New York,
and jurisdiction was asserted over their persons by virtue of service of process pursuant
to N. Y. Civ. PRAc. AcT § 229-b: "When any natural person or persons not residing in
[Vol. 18
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present a material contact within the foreign state, namely, authority
in the soliciting agent to accept funds from purchasers, which in Inter-
national Harvester had been very persuasive on the Supreme Court.
Nonetheless, service was vacated because the defendant was held not to
be within the jurisdiction of the court30
Seldom has a decision been arrived at in a more interesting manner
than was that of Judge Rifkind in Snyder v. J. G. White Engineering
Corporation?' A third party defendant here sought to vacate service
this state shall engage in business in this state, in any action against such person or
persons arising out of such business, the summons may be served, etc. .. ." Judge Chase
wrote the opinion, joined by Judge A. Hand, and stated that "principles determining what
is or is not engagement in business by a corporation hold true equally in respect to an
individual, and so decisions on that issue are directly in point on the question here
presented. .. " Id. at 203. Accord, N. Y. Automatic Canteen Corp. v. Keppel & Ruof,
195 Misc. 526, 90 N. Y. S. 2d 454 (Sup. Ct. 1949). Cf. Sterling Novelty Corp. v. Frank
& Hirsch Distributing Co., 299 N. Y. 208, 211, 86 N. E. 2d 564, 565 (1949): "The circum-
stance that the foreign corporate defendant is represented in its local activities by a sepa-
rate individual or by a separate corporation and not by a directly controlled subsidiary
or branch office is not in itself determinative?' But ef. Berman v. Affiliated Enterprises,
17 F. Supp. 305 (D. C. Me. 1936).
29. The court merely stated that International Harvester had been distinguished in the
Davega decision and that it was distinguishable from the instant case "for the same
reasons.' 146 F. 2d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 1944).
30. In his dissent Judge Learned Hand stated that the statute required that the cause
of action upon which suit was brought had to be one which arose out of activity carried
on within the state, and that therefore the statute was narrower in scope than "the full
power of the state.' (citing Hess v. Pawloski, 274 U. S. 352 (1927).) Therefore he would
look not to the federal court decisions, which erect constitutional limits, but to the state
decisions, e.g., Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y. 259, 115 N. E. 915 (1917),
for construction of the phrase "engaging in business."
A federal court, in deciding whether a foreign corporation is doing business so as to
be subject to service, should look not to state but to federal decisions, treating the
question as purely one of jurisdiction and within Rule 4 (d) (3) of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure. Mechanical Appliance Co. v. Castleman, 215 U. S. 437 (1910); Goldey
v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518 (1895); Myers Motors v. Kaiser-Frazer Sales Corp.,
76 F. Supp. 291 (D. C. Minn. 1948); Hedrick v. Canadian Pac. Ry, 28 F. Supp. 257
(S. D. Ohio 1939). There would appear to be some question, however, where process
is served pursuant to Rule 4 (d) (7) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure which states
that service is sufficient "if the summons and complaint are served . .. in the manner
prescribed by the law of the state in which the service is made.... . ." Kelly v. Delaware,
L. & W. R. R., 170 F. 2d 195, 196 (1st Cir. 1948).
The dissenting opinion in Deutsch v. Hoge, 146 F. 2d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 1944), also
carries a warning that care must be taken to distinguish between what wil support
service, from what will be a defense on the merits when a foreign corporation, unlicensed
to do business, sue upon a contract made within the forum state.
31. 60 F. Supp. 789 (S. D. N. Y. 1945); cf. Costello v. Lee, 43 F. Supp. 947 (S. D.
N. Y. 1941), where on very similar facts it was held that the corporation defendant was
not doing business.
In Butts v. Southern Pac. Co., 69 F. Supp. 895, 896 (S. D. N. Y. 1947), Judge Rilkind
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of process because it contended it was not "doing business" within New
York State, where service had been made. It maintained an office in
New York City and the name of the company appeared upon the office
door and in the Manhattan telephone directory. Counsel for the com-
pany had planned well in avoiding local contacts. All orders obtained
by the solicitor were subject to acceptance at the main office; and all
shipments were made directly from the home office to the customer. The
latter made his remittance not to the solicitor but to the home office.
However, the solicitor upon occasion would receive a check from a cus-
tomer (which he would immediately transmit to the home office), and
very infrequently the solicitor investigated complaints, although adjust-
ments were effected by the home office. The solicitation had continued
for several years and had resulted in a continuous stream of sales to
customers in New York State.
First, Judge Rifkind reviewed the leading decisions in the Second
Circuit and concluded that there was a hopeless division of opinion
among the judges as to what constituted "doing business."' 2 He next
cast his eyes in the direction of the Supreme Court cases. Referring
to a minority statement in Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. R., 3 he dis-
covered that the late Chief Justice Stone, ex-Justice Roberts, and Justices
Frankfurter and Jackson had there stood for the following proposition:
"A corporation both is 'found' and 'transacts business' in a district in which
it operates a railroad or in which it maintains an office for the solicitation of
freight or passenger traffic."34
To these four Justices he added Justice Rutledge on the basis of his
Frene opinion, and Judge Rifkind thereby secured a majority of the
then Supreme Court bench which apparently subscribed to the view
that "the maintenance of an office, plus the regular solicitation of busi-
said: "The current development of the doctrine of what constitutes doing business leaves
little doubt that defendant is doing business in this district .... I recently took note
of the new trend in Snyder v. J. G. White Engineering Corp .... Since then, that trend
has been confirmed by the Supreme Court. International Shoe Co. v. State of Washington,
1945, 326 U. S. 310 ......
32. He referred to all of the Second Circuit cases heretofore discussed and then stated
that he found such a division of opinion on what constituted doing business that he was
obliged to make a forecast; "and to use for such purpose whatever straws are available."
60 F. Supp. 789, 791 (S. D. N. Y. 1945).
33. 324 U. S. 439 (1945). Georgia, by a motion for leave to file a bill of complaint,
sought to invoke the original jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Art. III, § 2 of
the Federal Constitution. The Court granted the motion in this case in which was involved
a charge by the state that certain railroads had conspired in restraint of trade in the
fixing of rates discriminating against Georgia. As a subsidiary issue the question was
presented whether the defendant was doing business in Georgia.
34. Id. at 471.
[Vol. 18
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ness, constitutes 'transacting business', for the purpose of subjecting a
corporation so engaged to a given jurisdiction. '
INTERMENT OF THE GREEN RULE?
To those who were seeking to excise the rule of Green v. Chicago,
B. & Q. Ry. from our body of jurisdictional principles of law, Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington came as great encouragement.6 There
the defendant company was supplying each of its thirteen Washington
salesmen with a line of samples to be displayed to prospective pur-
chasers. Occasionally, sample rooms were rented by these salesmen,
and the cost of such rentals was paid by the company. The authority
of the salesmen was limited to exhibiting their samples and soliciting
orders from customers, at prices and terms fixed by the defendant.
Orders were transmitted to the home office for acceptance or rejec-
tion, and when they were accepted they were filled by shipments directly
from the home office to the customer. No salesman had authority to
enter into contracts or to make collections.
The Supreme Court held that the activities of the defendant were
sufficient to constitute "doing business," and that therefore the corpo-
ration was amenable to suit in the Washington state courts to recover
payments due to the State Unemployment Compensation Fund.
The opinion echoed the "fair play" sentiments of Judge Learned Hand,
referred to at an earlier point in this paper. For Chief Justice Stone,
author of the majority opinion, the test was not whether the activity
was "a little more or a little less." Instead, he saw satisfaction of due
process as depending "upon the quality and nature of the activity in
relation to the fair and orderly administration of the laws which it was
the purpose of the due process clause to insure.""7 He also had recourse
to the often maligned doctrine of "obligations commensurate with bene-
fits" in the following passage in his opinion:
"But to the extent that a corporation exercises the privilege of conducting
activities within a state, it enjoys the benefits and protection of the laws of
that state. The exercise of that privilege may give rise to obligations, and, so
far as those obligations arise out of or are connected with the activities within
35. It is not at all dear that "transacts business" is synonymous uith "doing business,"
although Judge Rifkind so treats it. United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U. S. 795, S07
(1948) (holding "transaction of business" to sustain venue under the Anti-Trust Acts
calls for less than does "doing business" for service of process). But cf. Eastman Kodak
Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U. S. 359 (1927); Myers Motors v. Kaiser-
Frazer Sales Corp., 76 F. Supp. 291 (D. C. Minn. 1948); Hinchdliffe Motors v. Wiflys-
Overland Motors, 30 F. Supp. 580 (D. C. Mass. 1939).
36. 326 U. S. 310 (1945).




the state, a procedure which requires the corporation to respond to a suit
brought to enforce them can, in most instances, hardly be said to be undue."38
Did this mean that the general rule of the Green case, namely, that
mere solicitation of itself was not doing business, was now being dis-
carded in favor of the "fairness" rule? Was International Shoe to be
held closely to its facts, the most important of which indicated that the
cause of action arose out of activities carried on in the assertive
state? It will be recalled that in Green, suit had been brought in Penn-
sylvania on a cause of action which arose outside the state, and it was
because of this distinction between these two cases that it was pointed
out earlier that the "mere solicitation" rule of Green should not be
accepted without some reservations.30 It may well be that the Supreme
Court, when faced with the problem, will hold that because of the dis-
tinction above mentioned, Green and International Shoe stand side
by side.
Important in this regard is the case of Lasky v. Norfolk & W. Ry.40
This was an action for damages for wrongful death and the court cited
International Shoe to support a holding that the defendant corporation
was "present."'" The facts of the case placed it almost on all fours
with Green, and it was clear that the cause of action had arisen out
of activities carried on outside the jurisdiction of the court. Neverthe-
less the rule of fairness, as expounded by Chief Justice Stone, was re-
ferred to and it weighed heavily in the determination of the court. Obvi-
ously the court did not feel that International Shoe should be confined
to tax matters,4 2 and there is no evidence to be gleaned from the opinion
that the court hesitated even slightly in rendering its decision because
the cause of action had arisen outside of its jurisdiction.43
38. Ibid.
39. Id. at 318.
40. 157 F. 2d 674 (6th Cir. 1946). See also, State v. Ford Motor Co., 308 S. C. 379,
38 S. E. 2d 242 (1946).
41. The federal district court had vacated process upon the authority of Philadelphia
& Reading Ry. v. McKibbin, 243 U. S. 264 (1917), and counsel for the railway supple-
mented the record on appeal with the Green case.
42. Cf. Nippert v. City of Richmond, 327 U. S. 416, 426 (1946): "In view of the
ruling in International Shoe Co. v. Washington . . . we put aside any suggestion that
'solicitation,' when conducted regularly and continuously within the State, so as to con-
stitute a course of business, may not be 'doing business' just as is the making of delivery,
at any rate for the purpose of focusing a tax which in other respects would be sustainable."
(italics supplied).
43. There was another basis for reaching the same decision in this case. The defendant
railroad had trackage within the Southern District of Ohio, and its solicitation activities
occurred in the Northern District. Service was made in the Northern District, the venue
of the action. Under Rule 4 (f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure "all process may
be served anywhere within the territorial limits of the state in which the district court
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There was an attempt made by a federal district court, in Bomze v.
Nardis Sportswear, Inc.,4" to circumscribe very narrowly the Supreme
Court decision. The court vacated process and found the Shoe case in-
applicable since it merely decided that a Washington state court's con-
struction of a local statute was not violative of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. Furthermore, suggested the court, "the fact that the proceeding
concerned a special tax statute might preclude the application of the
decision in general jurisdictional matters."4 8 On appeal to the Court of
is held" (in the absence of special statute), and the court felt that inasmuch as the
summons could have reached to the Southern District, there was a necessity for upholding
the service of process; cf. Mississippi Publishing Corp. v. Murphree, 326 U. S. 438 (1946).
Other cases placing no strictures upon the Internaional Shoe holding: DeSanta v. Nedhi
Corp., 81 F. Supp. 637, 640 (N. D. N. Y. 1948), af'd, 171 F. 2d 696 (2d Cir. 194S);
Bach v. Friden Calculating Machine Co., 167 F. 2d 679, 681 (6th Cir. 1948); Clover Leaf
Freight Lines, Inc. v. Pacific Coast Wholesalers Ass'n, 166 F. 2d 626,. 629, 630 (7th Cir.
1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 823 (1948); Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Moore,
333 U. S. 541, 551 (1948); Pine & Co., Inc. v. McConnell, 64 N. Y. S. 2d 814, 815
(Sup. CL 1946) (where a previous decision granting a motion to dismiss for lack of juris-
diction over a foreign corporation was reversed on the authority of Internoional Shoe),
aff'd, 273 App. Div. 218, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 279 (1st Dep't 1948), affd, 298 N. Y. 27, 80
N. E. 2d 137 (1948): "Defendants' local activities amply satisfied the long-recognized test
of what constitutes engaging in business, as laid down in the decisions of this court. (See,
e.g., Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N. Y. 529, 534, 58 N. E. 2d 719, 721 (1944); Tau=. v.
Susquehanna Coal Co., 220 N. Y 259, 267, 115 N E. 915, 917 (1917).) It is unnecessary,
at this time, to say whether and to what extent that test may be relaxed in reliance
upon the constitutional principles recently announced by the Supreme Court in Inter-
national Shoe Co. v. Washington. . . ." See also, Western Smelting & Refining Co. v.
Pennsylvania R. R., 81 F. Supp. 494, 497 (D. C. Neb. 1948); Smith v. Hall, 79 F. Supp.
473, 475 (N. D. Tex. 1948); Willett v. Union Pacific R. R., 76 F. Supp. 903, 904 (N. D.
Ohio 1948); Dees v. Santa Fe Trail Transportation Co., 71 F. Supp. 387, 389 (IV. D. Mo.
1947); Winkler-Koch Engineering Co. v. Universal Oil Products Co., 70 F. Supp. 77, 84
(S. D. N. Y. 1946). But cf. Learned Hand, J., in Kilpatrick v. Texas & Fac. Ry., 166 F.
2d 788, 790 (2d Cir. 1948), cert. denied, 335 U. S. 814 (1948): "The Court [in Internalional
Shoe] did not overrule that decision [of the Green case]; but it did give a new explanation
to corporate 'presence,' for it held that in order to determine that question the court
must balance the conflicting interests involved: i.e., whether the gain to the plaintiff m
retaining the action where it was, outweighed the burden imposed upon the defendant;
or vice versa. . . .' But see Kelly v. Delaware, L. & W. R. R., 170 F. 2d 195, 196 (1st
Cir. 1948); Leakley v. Canadian Pac. Express Co., 82 F. Supp. 906 (D. C. Alaska 1949);
Zuber v. Pennsylvania R. R., 82 F. Supp. 670, 675 (N. D. Ga. 1949); McWhorter v
Anchor Serum Co., 72 F. Supp. 437, 439 (W. D. Ark. 1947); Landaas v. Canister Co.,
69 F. Supp. 835, 841 (S. D. N. Y. 1946).
44. 68 F. Supp. 156 (S. D. X. Y. 1946).
45. Id. at 158. The district court judge pointed out that service of process under the
statute there under construction could be made by mail when the employer could not
be found within the state; and that therefore it might well be that the "presence" re-
quired in order to be subject to the tax is "somewhat less than the usual contacts
requisite to general jurisdiction."
19493
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
Appeals of the Second Circuit, the lower court was reversed. 40 Judge
Learned Hand, writing the opinion, found that under the construction
given "doing business" by the New York state courts, the defendant
was "present. 47 Because the cause of action had arisen out of activi-
ties carried on within the jurisdiction of the court, any federal question
was set at rest. In his discussion of International Shoe, Judge Hand
gave no intimation that he considered that case limited in its applica-
tion for the reasons advanced by the district court.
In view of the generally favorable reception accorded the Shoe deci-
sion, it is not too much to hope that the quick rule of thumb provided
by the Green rule will soon have expired. The new explanation of
corporate presence will certainly have a place for the "mere solicitation"
axiom, but only as one factor figuring in the final decision. "Solicitation
plus," the formula engendered by the International Harvester decision,
seems destined for like treatment. The constitutional limits of the "doing
business" concept will have been extended, and the courts will be at
liberty to accredit great persuasive force to solicitation which is regular,
continuous, and responsible for substantial sales; and this will also be
true, of course, of those causes of action which arise out of the solicita-
tion carried on within the state of the forum. The businessman to
whom solicitation bulks large in the corporate scheme of things may
presently find the courts in full accord with his way of thinking.
Counsel seeking to defeat defendant's motion to dismiss will gener-
ally follow the same procedure pursued under the "solicitation plus"
doctrine. As much evidence as possible will be amassed pointing to the
end that it will be more in keeping with principles of fairness to retain
jurisdiction over the defendant. All the additional activities, heretofore
heaped atop "mere solicitation," under present day procedure will still
prove useful where available to the plaintiff. To this extent all of the
earlier cases are important. Green has not been overruled; but before
long it may be found to have been quietly interred.
SOLICITATION AND DOING BUSINESS IN NEW YORK STATE
In a state court action in which the validity of service of process is
challenged, the first problem to resolve is purely one of state law: under
the circumstances does the forum state treat a foreign corporation as
being "present" ?48 The extent to which a state desires to exercise juris-
diction over a foreign corporation-and there is nothing that compels
such action-is a matter for each state to decide. It is only after juris-
46. 165 F. 2d 33 (2d Cir. 1948).
47. But see Goldey v. Morning News, 156 U. S. 518, 520 (1895).
48. See note 29 supra.
[Vol. 18
SOLICITATION AS DOING BUSINESS
diction has been asserted that the question may arise whether such
attempt violates the due process clause or the interstate commerce
clause of the Federal Constitution.49
The time-honored Tauza v. Susquehanna Coal Co. is accepted as
stating the New York test of "doing business": that the corporation
must be engaged in the forum state with a "fair measure of permanence
and continuity," and that the activity carried on must be regular and
systematic ° Important from our point of view, Tauza involved a
"regular and systematic" course of solicitation which resulted in a
steady stream of shipments into New York State, not unlike the Supreme
Court case of International Harvester v. Kentucky mentioned earlier.
The usual devices were resorted to in order to avoid amenability to
service. All orders obtained by the solicitors had to be approved by the
Pennsylvania home office, and shipments were made directly from the
home office to the customers. The latter made their payments directly
to the home office. On the other side of the ledger, the defendant main-
tained an office and a bank account in New York, the latter being used
for the payment of salaries and for petty cash disbursements incidental
to office upkeep. That the cause of action sued upon had no relation
to the business transacted within the forum state was held not to cause
a failure of jurisdiction.
Holzer v. Dodge added the point that the business carried on within
the assertive state must be a substantial part of the wholet and the
holdings of this case and Tauza have proved to be the foundation for
the law of "doing business" in New York.
In any solicitation case where there is no resultant flow of goods into
New York, or where the solicitation is less regular, Tauza of course
would not be conclusive in its application. In such cases the method
generally followed is to use as a point of departure the language of Tauiza
which laid down as the test of corporate "presence" whether activities
sufficiently extensive and substantial are carried on within the state.
Thence the courts proceed in many different ways, and seemingly forget
at times that the many federal court cases in this field do not purport
to advise how far the New York courts should go, but rather how far
they may go before Constitutional limits are transcended. Put another
49. Pulson v. American Rolling Mill Co., 170 F. 2d 193, 194 (Ist Cir. 1948). Thurman
v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry, 254 Mlass. 569, 151 N. E. 63 (1926). But see Lillibridge, Inc.
v. Johnson Bronze Co., 220 App. Div. 573, 222 N. Y. Supp. 130 (Ist Dep't 1927), af'd,
247 N. Y. 548, 161 N. E. 177 (1928).
The court in the Pulson case, although it applied state law, suggested that the consti-
tutional boundaries in existence when the state law was laid down had been extended by
Internaional Shoe.
50. 220 N. Y. 259, 267, 115 N. E. 915, 917 (1917).
51. 233 N. Y. 216, 221, 135 N. E. 268, 269 (1922).
19491
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW
way, the state courts frequently depend upon federal cases upholding
jurisdiction to support their own decisions. This coalescence of how
far New York will go, with how far it may go, should not be lost sight
of when one attempts to predict the outcome of any litigation concerning
solicitation of business as "doing business."
VITAL CONTACTS IN NEW YoRK
A study of New York cases reveals that there is a tendency to hold
certain contacts vital in influencing a decision that a foreign corporation
is "present" within this jurisdiction, when those contacts occur in addi-
tion to solicitation that is not of the nature found in the Tauza case.
Perhaps use of the word "vital" is not strictly accurate since the courts,
upon occasion, have said that it is only the cumulative effect of the
contacts which is significant; 2 but it certainly can be said that certain
factors are more important than others.
In addition to soliciting business, many foreign corporations maintain
offices in New York. The New York Court of Appeals made much of
the fact that one such corporation with an office in New York City paid
an occupancy tax to the city, and stated that "payment is consistent
only with the doing of business here." 3 While the appropriate section
of the City Code 4 calls for payment when premises are occupied "for
any gainful purpose," it still is difficult to comprehend why payment in
itself should be so important. We know that merely maintaining an
office in addition to solicitation is insufficient to make for "doing
business."55
The highest court of New York has also held that a foreign corpo-
ration is not within the state solely by reason of the fact that it is wholly
owned by a New York corporation, even though the latter may control
all of its policies."6 This is a realistic approach and squares with the
holding that a corporation is not to be considered "present" solely by
reason of the fact that its subsidiary is present there. 7
52. Pine & Co. v. McConnell, 273 App. Div. 218, 223, 76 N. Y. S. 2d 279, 283 (1st Dep't
1948), aff'd, 298 N. Y. 27, 80 N. E. 2d 137 (1948).
53. 293 N. Y. 529, 537, 58 N. E. 2d 719, 723 (1944).
54. N. Y. C. ADmIn. CODE c. 17, tit. C § C17-4.0(a) formerly c. 44, tit. B § 1012-1.0(a).
55. This is the holding of the Green case. Here of course a federal case is important
since it was decided that to hold a foreign corporation amenable to process under such
circumstances would be a denial of due process.
56. Compania Mexicana Refinadora Island v. Compania Metropolitana de Oleoductos,
250 N. Y. 203, 164 N. E. 907 (1928); Waterman Corp. v. Johnston, 82 N. Y. S. 2d 655
(Sup. Ct. 1948).
57. That a subsidiary company does business within a state does not warrant a finding
that the parent is present there for purposes of service of process: Consolidated Textile
Corp. v. Gregory, 289 U. S. 85 (1933); Peterson v. Chicago, Rock Island & Pac. Ry.,
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Remembering that it is the cumulative effect of all the contacts which
is important, and that rarely, if ever, will one be determinative, the
corporation which desires to avoid New York "presence" should
religiously avoid any reference in reports, advertising or letterheads to
a New York office. 8 Telephone directory listings should be omitted,
and the same applies to listing in the directories found in building
lobbies. 9 Use should be made of independent solicitors, if necessary,
to avoid these particular contacts c0
Profiting from one lesson of International Shoe, frequently cited by
New York courts, solicitors should preferably be non-residents of New
York. Of course they should have no authority to contract in connection
with any matter in behalf of their employer, and all orders which they
obtain should be made subject to approval at the home office so that
the contract is completed outside the state. In addition, they should be
enjoined from taking any payments; instead, all payments should be
made directly to the home office by the customer. Naturally, shipments
should be made f.o.b. the home office situs to the customer directly, and
there should be no intrastate shipments. The solicitors should not settle
claims or adjust complaints."'
There should be no bank account maintained within New York, if
this is possible without causing unreasonable inconvenience, and sala-
ries, rents and taxes can be paid directly from the home office 2 Prob-
ably a stock transfer office can safely be kept within the state, and the
same is true of a financial office for paying interest on corporate bonds.'
Certainly these things are not a part of the business conducted by the
commercial corporation here under discussion. 4
No corporate books should be allowed to rest within the state, and
205 U. S. 364 (1907); Conley v. Mathieson Alkali Works, 190 U. S. 406 (1903); Stetson
China Co. v. D. C. Andrews & Co., 9 F. R. D. 135 (N. D. Ill. 1948); Amtorg Trading
Corp. v. Standard Oil Co., 47 F. Supp. 466 (S. D. N. Y. 1942).
58. Cochran Box & Manufacturing Co. v. Monroe Binder Board Co., 232 N. Y. 503,
134 N. E. 547 (1921).
59. Name listings alone are of negligible importance, but when added to other contacts
they may become material. McCaskell Filters Inc. v. Goslin-Birmingham Mffg. Co., 81
N. Y. S. 2d 309 (Sup. Ct. 1948).
60. See note 28 supra; see Lilybridge, Inc. v. Johnson Bronze Co., 247 N. Y. 548,
161 N. E. 177 (1928), af'g 220 App. Div. 573, 222 N. Y. Supp. 130 (1927).
61. Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 145 F. 2d S00 (2d Cir. 1944); Deutsch v. Hoge,
146 F. 2d 201 (2d Cir. 1944), cert. denied, 325 U. S. 852 (1945); Davega v. Lincoln
Furniture Co., 29 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir. 1928).
62. Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N. Y. 529, 58 N. E. 2d 719 (1944); Ledermann v. Penn-
sylvania R. R., 193 Misc. 941, 85 N. Y. S. 2d 485 (N. Y. City CL 1949).
63. Yeckes-Eichenbaum, Inc. v. McCarthy, 290 N. Y. 437, 49 N. E. 2d 517 (1943).
64. Toledo Rys. & Light Co. v. Hill, 244 U. S. 49. 53 (1917).
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there should be no stock of inventory in storage here. 5 Samples may
be shipped in to solicitors, and may even be sold if such sales occur
very infrequently, although the latter act should be avoided where
possible.66 However, the use of permanent sample rooms for display
of wares with the corporate principal paying the rent is enjoined under
International Shoe.
Carriers cannot issue bills of lading or sell passenger tickets in addi-
tion to solicitation of trafficY What is more, as little service as possible
should be given to the customer in arranging for through traffic. Obvi-
ously no trackage can be located within New York.
Executives of our foreign corporations should not maintain any offices
within New York, and as few officers and directors as possible should
reside there. Boards of directors, executive committees, and even stock-
holders should conduct their meetings elsewhere than in New York. 8
CONCLUSION
It is still impossible to state with assurance that Green and its "mere
solicitation" holding has been absorbed by the more expansive approach
to the solicitation problem taken in International Shoe. The reception
accorded the later case does indicate, however, that before long, if it
has not already occurred, "mere solicitation" may be sufficient for
corporate "presence" if it is carried on in such a manner that it becomes
"fair" that the corporation be subjected to the jurisdiction of the local
courts. Green surely is out of line with the realities of business affairs,
and should be discarded in favor of the "fairness" test.
Cases in the upper and lower courts of New York State indicate that
those courts have just about decided that the limits of how far they
will go and how far they can go constitutionally are co-terminous. This
is to be gathered from the frequency with which federal cases, deciding
constitutional questions, are cited to support state court holdings. If
this theory is correct, a knowledge of state and federal decisions is a
requisite for one planning the scheme of business for a large corporation."
65. Chaplin v. Selznick, 293 N. Y. 529, 58 N. E. 2d 719 (1944).
66. Davega v. Lincoln Furniture Co., 29 F. 2d 164 (2d Cir. 1928).
67. Barnett v. Texas & Pacific Ry., 145 F. 2d 800 (2d Cir. 1944).
68. Pomeroy v. Hocking Valley Ry., 218 N. Y. 530, 113 N. E. 504 (1916); cf. Garson
v. Richmond, F. & P. R. R., 82 N. Y. S. 2d 637 (Sup. Ct. 1948) (residence of two of
nine directors within New York and meeting of Board there in itself insufficient. Porneroy
v. Hocking Valley Ry., supra, distinguished because there people were employed in New
York and solicitation was carried on).
69. Wajtman v. Pennsylvania R. R., 298 N. Y. 909, 85 N. E. 2d 57 (1949).
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